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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

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17 JUNE 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

17 June 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION (8 - 14 JUNE 1970)

Moscow (3045 items)

Supreme Soviet Elections	(10%)	36%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	12%]
[Kosygin Speech	(--)	7%]
[Podgornyy Speech	(--)	3%]
International Communist	(9%)	9%
Party Meeting in		
Moscow, 1st		
Anniversary		
Soyuz 9	(9%)	7%
China	(6%)	7%
Middle East	(5%)	3%
Indochina	(10%)	3%

Peking (3093 items)

Indochina	(51%)	37%
[Cambodia	(19%)	25%]
[Vietnam	(10%)	6%]
Romanian Leader	(--)	26%
Bodnaras in		
CPR		
Domestic Issues	(25%)	17%
Middle East	(2%)	4%
Chou En-lai Message	(--)	2%
to Kosygin on		
Soviet Earth-		
quake		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media continue to score U.S. intervention in Cambodia with further attacks on President Nixon's 3 June speech at the Paris session on the 11th and in other propaganda. Attention to U.S. dissent over the war includes a NHAN DAN article on the 14th which discusses the debate in the Senate over curbing the President's war powers.

The top Soviet leaders in their election speeches voice pro forma criticism of the "spread" of U.S. aggression in Indochina. The leaders do not explicitly attack Peking's Indochina policies, but Podgornyy in a seeming allusion to Mao Tse-tung's statement says that "foreign observers" note, "with some justification," that Peking's "pseudorevolutionary clamor" for the overthrow of imperialism becomes a whisper "when the organization of a practical rebuff to the aggressors, who have gone too far, comes up for discussion." Routine Moscow comment continues to score Peking's "obstruction" of united action and again recalls Soviet efforts to convene a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese meeting.

Peking continues to refrain from attacks on the USSR in the context of Indochina. Continued attention to Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement includes the quoting by Chou En-lai--at an 11 June banquet for the visiting Romanian delegation--of the passage which says that the people of a small country can defeat aggression by a big country if they dare rise in struggle. Chou does not explicitly mention Chinese support for the Cambodians, but he observes that Sihanouk's recently concluded visit to the DRV has further strengthened the "militant unity" of the three Indochinese peoples.

Sihanouk's "state visit" to North Korea, first announced on the 12th, provides the occasion for further stress on Indochinese solidarity and determination to continue the struggle. In his speech on the 15th, Sihanouk broaches the issue of a political settlement, saying that "we do not refuse" a peaceful solution of the Cambodian problem, but it cannot be separated from Vietnam and Laos. To date only Vietnamese communist media are known to have acknowledged Secretary General U Thant's 11 June call for an international conference.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SCORED, SENATE DISSENT ON CAMBODIA NOTED

Earlier criticism of President Nixon's 3 June TV speech on the U.S. operation in Cambodia is repeated in a NHAN DAN commentary on the 12th. NHAN DAN echoes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and a Hanoi radio commentary on the 5th in ridiculing the President's failure to

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mention his "number one" military target--the Viet Cong headquarters complex. This line is also repeated in a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 16th of a 10 June article in the Front paper QUAN GIAI PHONG. NHAN DAN also says the President was specific on points that cannot be checked, such as the amount of ammunition and weapons "which he alleged had been seized in the 'Viet Cong's sanctuaries' in Cambodia."

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th assails the President for again threatening to take strong and effective measures "if our kith-and-kin northern compatriots continued to supply aid for the South" and if the southerners continued their struggle. The commentary asks rhetorically "wasn't Johnson equally aggressive and threatening before being knocked off the political stage to return to his Texas cattle ranch to write memoirs about the failures in his life?" As for President Nixon's threats, it says they will only heighten the Vietnamese people's vigilance, adding that since his previous threats did not bring him any results, "how can Nixon expect that new threats can intimidate our people?"

SENATE The Senate's 11 June rejection of the Administration-favored
DEBATE Byrd amendment on the President's war powers prompts a
 NHAN DAN article on the 14th which cites the Western press in
calling the vote a "major defeat for the Nixon Administration."
Declaring that the "credibility gap" was increased by the Cambodian
incursion, NHAN DAN says that the extent of the distrust in the U.S.
President "in the highest legislative organ" is shown by the
Cooper-Church amendment--which calls for the suspension of expenditures
for U.S. troops in Cambodia, including funds reserved for U.S. military
advisors commanding GVN troops and other "mercenaries" there.

NHAN DAN says that despite the President's "maneuvers"--such as sending "fact-finding missions"* to the battle zone in an attempt to "fool the American Congress and people with imaginary military victories," and the submission of counteramendments by Administration supporters in the Senate to "alter" the Cooper-Church amendment--the "widening" credibility gap between the Nixon Administration and the American people can never be bridged.

* NHAN DAN does not specifically note either the sending of a mixed gubernatorial-senatorial mission to Indochina or the upcoming House of Representatives mission.

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The paper says that the Indochinese peoples have drawn "two conclusions" against the background of the "'constitutional crisis'" in the United States; namely, that President Nixon is continuing with his plans of armed invasion against Cambodia and war expansion to the whole of Indochina "even with U.S. infantry," but that the United States is "sure to land in incalculable difficulties" as the Indochina situation and the domestic U.S. scene become "more critical."

MOSCOW Citing a dispatch from a TASS Washington correspondent, Moscow's domestic service and TASS promptly on the 11th report the defeat of the Byrd amendment. The dispatch says that the anti-war bloc in the Senate "scored a considerable success in trying to forestall further extension of the Vietnam war into Cambodian territory." Its rejection, TASS continues, shows that an "ever growing number of senators are beginning to realize the full danger of giving new powers to a government nursing adventurist plans to occupy Cambodian territory through South Vietnamese puppet and Thai mercenary forces and further spread the war in Indochina." A commentary by Valentin Zorin, carried by Moscow's domestic service on the 12th, adds that the defeat of the Administration-backed Byrd amendment was in effect a "resolution of no confidence in the Nixon Administration." He says that the Administration "suffered a serious defeat" which, had it occurred in West European countries, would have led to the resignation of the government.

DELEGATES AT PARIS ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, DEMAND WITHDRAWAL

The VNA account of the 70th session of the Paris talks on 11 June indicates that PRG deputy delegation head Nguyen Van Tien criticized President Nixon's 3 June address on the Cambodian situation along the lines of earlier Front and Hanoi comment, saying that Tien pointed out "that Nixon's allegations about peace were only empty words." VNA does not acknowledge that Tien in this context quoted former Defense Secretary Clifford's article in LIFE as saying that the Cambodian moves will not achieve peace but will postpone or even destroy the chances for obtaining peace; however, other Hanoi comment in the past few weeks has quoted from the Clifford article. VNA also quotes Tien as saying that while public reaction had forced the President to pledge to withdraw U.S. forces from Cambodia by 30 June, it is "clear" that the United States is bent on continuing its "war of aggression" since Saigon troops will remain and Thai mercenaries will be sent, and the U.S. air strikes in Cambodia will continue. VNA also observes that Tien claimed that President Nixon had invented imaginary victories about the

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Cambodian operations in trying to create an atmosphere of "fake" optimism to cover up the United States' "heavy failure," but it does not acknowledge Tien's allegation that the United States believes it can set up a "puppet" administration efficient enough to help annex Cambodia.

In reporting that Tien had again spelled out the "two fundamental problems" in settling the war--a total, rapid and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam--neither VNA nor LPA acknowledge his remark that at the previous session the U.S. delegate "treacherously pretended that 'constructive talks should start about fundamental issues.'"

The VNA account notes that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy said that the complete and unconditional allied troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia "is now an imperative demand," but it omits much of his argumentation. Thus, VNA fails to include Vy's assertion that given a withdrawal, President Nixon's concern about the safety of U.S. troops would be removed. VNA also ignores Vy's remark that U.S. troop safety has become a "main theme" of the President's speeches and that this was repeated again in his 3 June TV report on the Cambodian operation. The cryptic account similarly fails to report that Vy reviewed the "reasonable, appropriate and generous" PRG position on U.S. troop withdrawal, specifically the proposal last December at the 46th session that should the United States agree to withdraw within six months, a timetable and measures to insure the troops' safety could be discussed.

VNA notes Vy's generalized remarks regarding U.S. "aggression" over the past 16 years and its "violation" of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, and selectively reports his remarks on Cambodia: It notes Vy's charge that since 30 April "the temporarily occupied areas" in South Vietnam have been used by the United States as "staging and rear areas for its aggression against Cambodia." But it fails to report Vy's claim that "conversely, U.S. and Saigon puppet troops use newly established military bases in Cambodia to attack the PLAF and liberated areas in South Vietnam." The omission of this later charge seems strange since it appeared in comment on the President's speech on at least one occasion--in the 5 June NHAN DAN article.

The allied delegates' formal remarks are not dignified by even the usual cryptic description of each: VNA lumps the allied speeches, saying that Habib and Lam "repeated their allegations aimed at

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justifying the U.S. policy of war continuation and expansion in Indochina and covering up the warlike and traitorous nature of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique." It adds that they also "obdurately rehearsed their absurd demand" for a mutual troop withdrawal and continued to oppose the 10-point proposal for establishing a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam. VNA says further that all their "perfidious and deceitful allegations" were "flatly rejected" by the DRV and PRG delegations.

PROPAGANDA IGNORES GVN PROPOSAL TO RELEASE POW'S

Consistent with propaganda practice last fall, Vietnamese communist media do not acknowledge GVN delegate Lam's announcement at the 11 June session of his government's intention to release on 11 July a group of 62 North Vietnamese wounded prisoners and captured fishermen. And there is, of course, no acknowledgment that DRV delegation spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le in his post-session briefing commented on Lam's announcement and said that DRV delegate Vy repeated Xuan Thuy's 4 December 1969 comments on the prisoner issues--that is, that North Vietnamese fishermen must be given their freedom and that "patriots" in the South must also be freed and be permitted to go to the North or remain in the South. Hanoi media had maintained silence regarding the prisoners in its accounts of the 4 December session and of the 42d session on 13 November when Lam had proposed releasing 62 prisoners.

Hanoi media had discussed the issue of prisoners in the South in 1968, however: An 11 August 1968 VNA authorized statement deprecated allied statements on releasing DRV captured personnel, and another authorized statement on 22 October commented on the release of a group of DRV seamen.*

PEKING REPORTS CHOU EN-LAI RECEIVED MME. BINH, XUAN THUY

On 17 June a Peking domestic service report notes that Chou En-lai that day received PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh for a "warm and friendly talk." The broadcast says that she had arrived in Peking on 13 June "on her way home from Paris," but does not mention the Paris talks.

After leaving Paris Mme. Binh visited Prague from 8 to 11 June where she was received by various officials including Foreign Minister Marko. On 11 June TASS reported that she arrived in

* For a discussion see the TRENDS of 14 August 1968, page 4, and of 18 December 1968, page 5.

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Moscow, being met at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin. There is no available Soviet report of her departure from the USSR, nor any report that she met with any officials. At a 10 June press conference in Prague, according to CTK, she said that she left Paris in order to visit "several countries" before returning home. She added that she was still the head of the Paris delegation and that she would return to Paris "according to the situation and the decision of my government."

The Peking broadcast notes that Xuan Thuy also had previously been received by Chou En-lai when he had stopped in Peking on "his way home from Paris," but indicates no date. Moscow had briefly reported that Thuy stopped in Moscow on 11-12 May, but had not indicated that he saw any officials. This is the first time Peking is known to have acknowledged such stopovers by members of Paris delegations with the exception of one case in June 1969, when Peking reported that Tran Buu Kiem--who came back to assume his post in the PRG--was received by Chou. Peking stops by Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem have been reported by VNA on several occasions, however.

FEW REPORTS ON CAMBODIAN ACTION, DRV DENIES TROOPS IN ANGKOR WAT

Vietnamese communist media continue to laud the "victories" of the Khmer "liberation forces" but there are few reports on specific, current action. Thus, the only available reference to the fighting in Kompong Speu city is in a terse Hanoi radio item on the 15th which mentions "fighting in and around the city" the day before. Typical of the nature and tone of the propaganda is a NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th which says that the struggle of all three Indochinese peoples is filled with "new advantages and capabilities."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in a commentary on the 13th, carried by Hanoi radio and summarized by VNA the same day, denounced as "fabricated news" and a "despicable slanderous trick" Cambodian Government reports that 10,000 Vietnamese communist troops, including Pathet Lao and Chinese elements, were quartered in the Angkor Wat temple complex. The commentary says that these news reports were "invented" in order to "slander the Khmer people's patriotic struggle, deceive public opinion, and provide the United States with a motive to send satellite troops to Cambodia."

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SIHANOUK PAYS STATE VISIT TO NORTH KOREA

The first announcement that Sihanouk would make a state visit to the DPRK came in a KCNA dispatch on the 12th, and a propaganda fanfare from Pyongyang greets his arrival there on 15 June.* Sihanouk was met at the railway station by Kim Il-song and there was a "grand ceremony" including a 21-gun salute, and a crowd of 200,000 reportedly greeted the motorcade as it drove through the city. Pyongyang media carry the texts of speeches by Kim Il-song and Sihanouk at a banquet on the 15th.

Peking's NCNA notes that Sihanouk was seen off from Peking by Chou En-lai, says that he was greeted by officials in Chinese cities on the way, reports his arrival and activities in Pyongyang, and carries the full text of the banquet speeches. TASS promptly reports his arrival but carries only a brief report of the speeches at the banquet. The single available Hanoi report is a VNA item on the 16th which reports the arrival speeches.

At the 15 June banquet, Sihanouk thanked the DPRK for its "inestimable consolation, sympathy, and effective support" since the coup to help organize "the struggle for national liberation" in Cambodia, and he noted that the DPRK and the PRC were the first states to recognize the Royal Government of National Union. He says that the DPRK and the PRC are aware--and the third world should be--that the struggle waged by the three peoples of Indochina will influence the struggle of other peoples against the "common enemy" and thus they do not spare "support, effective solidarity, and material aid" to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Praising the solidarity of the three Indochinese peoples as manifested at the April summit conference, he says that "we are receiving important material aid" from some states, especially the PRC, and "effective support" from many others, particularly the DPRK.

In this context Sihanouk also claims that President Nixon "employs the Thailand puppets for military intervention in hope of saving the Phnom Penh puppet regime," and that this "gives us Khmers" the right, which "will be exercised in future and in all eventualities," to appeal for aid from the "fraternal Laotian and Vietnamese and other friendly peoples."

* Speeches note that this is Sihanouk's second visit to the DPRK; his earlier state visit was in October 1965. Coming Sihanouk visits--dates unspecified--to Iraq and the UAR are announced by Baghdad radio and Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 14 and 16 June, respectively.

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Kim Il-song at the banquet similarly praises the solidarity of the three Indochinese people as expressed at the summit conference and pledges that the DPRK "will actively support by all necessary means" the Cambodian people's struggle. Kim in both his welcoming and banquet speeches stresses that U.S. aggression in Cambodia is only a part of overall U.S. aggressive intent in Asia, and he mentions Korea and Taiwan in this regard. He says this must be met by a strengthened "united front" of the "revolutionary countries" of Asia, and notes the tradition of a joint Sino-Korean struggle as well as that of the Indochinese people over the years."

ISSUE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

SIHANOUK In his banquet speech on the 15th, Sihanouk declares that "we, of course, do not refuse a peaceful solution of the Cambodian problem, but this problem cannot be separated from the Vietnam and Laos problems." Asserting that none of the countries can enjoy security and peace if the United States does not agree to withdrawal, he goes on to say that if the United States does not accept this "no conference is acceptable to us." This formulation stops short of earlier Sihanouk statements which have rejected a conference out of hand. For example, speaking at a 27 May meeting in Hanoi he said that he rejected the "terms of the enemy" who demand an "international conference" and added that Cambodia's position is the same as that once enunciated by Ho Chi Minh--in a 1966 interview--that the Vietnam war would end immediately after the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.

Sihanouk goes on to score the "interference" of the three-nation mission--Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia--set up by the Djakarta Conference and Secretary General U Thant "for trying to impose an American peace on us." But he does not mention the calls by the Djakarta Conference and U Thant for an international conference.

MOSCOW Moscow media's current avoidance of the issue of an international conference is pointed up in the TASS reports of Sihanouk's speech and of U Thant's 11 June statement, in which he called for a 15-nation conference. TASS quotes Sihanouk as saying that the Indochinese countries could not enjoy peace and security until American troops are withdrawn, and that he opposed the attempts to impose an "American peace." But it ignores his references to an international conference, the three-nation mission, and U Thant. A brief TASS item on the 12th reports that the Secretary General the day before had condemned the continuation and expansion of the war, but does not mention his call for a conference.

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A brief TASS item on the 17th announces U Thant's arrival in Moscow "at the invitation of the Soviet Government" and says "he told newsmen" that he plans to have meetings with Soviet leaders.

No communist source is known to have mentioned the forthcoming visit to Moscow by the Djakarta Conference three-nation mission.

HANOI AND THE FRONT Consistent with the DRV's opposition to any UN role in Indochina, a VNA commentary on the 15th--which the Hanoi radio press review the next day says is published in the papers--says U Thant's proposal fits the U.S. intention to use such a conference as a cover for aggression and to "legalize" the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique. The commentary also scores the Secretary General for failing to denounce U.S. crimes in Indochina and for repeating the U.S. call for "mutual" troop withdrawal, thus putting the aggressor on a par with the victim.

VNA does not specify that U Thant's call was for a 15-nation conference. But this is acknowledged in an LPA commentary on the 16th which notes it would include representatives of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique." The commentary adds without elaboration that this is reminiscent of the "current activities" of the delegation of the Djakarta Conference. The commentary demands that the United States "totally, speedily, and unconditionally" withdraw its troops and those of its allies from South Vietnam and Indochina, and says that a "correct settlement" should be based on the NFLSV 10-point program, the DRV four points, the NLHX five-point statement, and Sihanouk's 23 March proclamation.

PEKING Current Peking propaganda says nothing about efforts for a political settlement. Thus, an MCNA commentary on the 12th cites a Malaysian paper as criticizing the three-nation mission set up by the Djakarta Conference, but there is no mention of a UN role in Indochina or a new conference. It quotes the paper as assailing the meetings held by the three "U.S. lackeys" to "plot further intervention" in Cambodian affairs, and as observing that "neither the United Nations nor the 'three-member ministerial commission' can save U.S. imperialism."

SOVIET LEADERS SCORE U.S. "AGGRESSION"

The three top Soviet leaders in their election speeches, in varying phraseology, score the United States for allegedly expanding its "aggression" throughout Indochina. There are some inconsistencies in their other generally routine comments. Brezhnev, speaking on the 12th, mentions a political settlement in declaring Soviet support

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for the "just principles and demands advanced by the patriotic forces of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." But unlike Kosygin, who spoke on the 10th, he does not specify that the "main demand" is a U.S. troop withdrawal. And Podgorny, speaking on the 11th, does not broach a political settlement.

Brezhnev follows his assertion of support for the demands of the three Indochinese peoples with the promise that the USSR will provide "all necessary assistance to those fighting for their freedom and independence." Podgorny promises "necessary help and support to Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina," but Kosygin fails to mention the issue of aid.

While the leaders do not explicitly attack Peking's Indochina policies, Podgorny's remarks on Peking's "pseudorevolutionary clamor" seem aimed at Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement.

On 15 June VNA carries a correspondent's dispatch from Moscow reporting Brezhnev's and Podgorny's expressions of support for the Indochinese people, but it of course omits the polemical remarks made by Podgorny. On the 12th VNA carried a report of Kosygin's speech.

MOSCOW CONTINUES ATTACK ON PRC STANCE

Moscow's continued attacks on Peking's Indochina policies included an 11 June Mandarin-language Radio Peace and Progress broadcast pegged to the anniversary of the international party conference in Moscow last year. It recalls that since February 1965 the Soviet Union has "more than once" made suggestions to the PRC concerning the adoption of united action in supporting Vietnam and the "convocation of a meeting of high-ranking representatives of the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the DRV." It recalls the Polish initiative in November 1965* (made public by Tirana in February 1966), suggesting a meeting on concerted action to support the DRV, as well as similar suggestions made by "other socialist countries," all of which were rejected by the PRC. Bringing the picture up to date, the commentary says that in late April and early May Peking again tried to alienate the Indochinese peoples from their "faithful allies" by slandering the USSR and other socialist states--an apparent allusion to Peking's joint editorial attacking the USSR and other socialist countries on the occasion of the Lenin centenary.

* Moscow comment last month did not directly mention the Polish proposal in referring to initiatives for a meeting. See the TRENDS of 6 May, page 11.

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A Moscow commentary attributed to Boris Mikhailov broadcast in Lao on 11 and 12 June repeats the charge that the "Maoist clique" is to blame for the 18 March Cambodian coup.* It also repeats the charge that "Soviet weapons bound for Vietnam have been stopped in the PRC on several occasions." The commentary contrasts Peking's alleged "encouragement" of U.S. aggression with the "material and political support given the Vietnamese and Laotian people" by the USSR "and other socialist countries," and it recalls that NIMX Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit--in an interview published in PRAVDA on 12 May, when he was en route to the Cairo conference in support of Laos--expressed gratitude for Soviet support "in various forms."

A 9 June PRAVDA editorial article on the international party conference anniversary recalls several recent demonstrations of international solidarity regarding Southeast Asia, including the Paris conference of CP's of European capitalist countries which called for coordinated action, the Indochinese peoples' summit conference, the Stockholm conference of world peace forces, and the Cairo conference in support of Laos. It does not mention the PRC in this context, however.

USSR-DRV SUPPLEMENTAL AID AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW

On 11 June TASS and VNA reported the signing in Moscow of agreements on "supplementary economic and military assistance" to the DRV. As reported by TASS, the communique on the signing says the agreements are to provide for the delivery to the DRV in 1970 of "complete sets of equipment for enterprises and other equipment as well as commodities and materials necessary for the national economy of the DRV and further strengthening of its defense capacity." The communique points out, according to TASS, that the additional Soviet assistance comes "at a time when the American imperialists are intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam, when they are bombing some areas of the DRV, carrying out military escalation in Laos, and waging an aggressive war in Cambodia."

The TASS and VNA reports note that the agreements were signed by DRV Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Nghiem Ba Duc and on the Soviet side by First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign

* This charge was introduced in the NEW TIMES article by Ukraintsev which was broadcast in a number of foreign languages on 7 June, but not to Indochina. (See the 10 June TRENDS, pages 9 and 23-24.) A VNA service message from the home office in Hanoi to the Moscow office on 13 June asked for the text of the NEW TIMES article.

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Economic Relations Ivan Arkhipov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ivan Grishin. VNA reports that a reception was given the same day by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

The "supplementary" aid agreement comes in the wake of a similar supplementary agreement signed in Peking on 26 May.* Moscow normally signs regular aid agreements when the DRV Government economic delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi makes its annual bloc tours. The most recent such agreement, however, was signed by Kosygin and Pham Van Dong last October, when Dong was visiting the USSR for the October Revolution anniversary. Although Peking is not known previously to have signed a "supplementary" agreement with the DRV, an extra aid agreement was signed by the USSR in November 1968, when Le Thanh Nghi made a special trip to the USSR in addition to his usual tour.

* This agreement is discussed in the 27 May 1970 FBIS TRENDS, page 11.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow's current hard line on China has extended to the Peking talks, with the three top Soviet leaders in their election speeches on 10, 11, and 12 June deploring the lack of progress at the negotiating table and decrying Chinese hostility. The leaders reaffirmed a desire to reduce tensions, though only Kosygin explicitly expressed Soviet intent to persist in the talks. As in Soviet propaganda in general, the leaders' speeches contained no charges of current border provocations.

A session of the DRV National Assembly,* announced on 6 June, provided the occasion for Hanoi to again record its concern over the state of Sino-Soviet relations. The Council of Ministers' political report read by Premier Pham Van Dong, broadcast textually by Hanoi radio on the 7th, "warmly" expressed hope for "good success" at the talks in the interests of the Soviet and Chinese people as well as the entire socialist camp. Dong had also expressed this hope in a speech in Peking on 23 October, three days after the opening of the talks; at that time, though, he did not refer to the interests of the socialist camp.

Against the background of its active efforts to woo independent parties in the communist movement, Peking has continued to show polemical restraint toward the Soviets, evidenced most notably in the absence of an anti-Soviet dimension in propaganda on Indochina.** Peking has used the visit of a high-level Romanian delegation to make its sharpest attacks on Moscow since the joint editorial on the Lenin centenary in April, but even in this context the current restraint is shown in Chinese avoidance of attacks on the Soviets by name (compared with Chou En-lai's direct denunciation of Moscow at a Romanian reception in Peking on 23 August 1968, during the period of bitter Chinese polemics that followed the invasion of Czechoslovakia).

SOVIET LEADERS BLAME CHINESE FOR IMPASSE AT PEKING TALKS

Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Brezhnev in their successive election speeches all directly blamed the Chinese for causing an impasse in the Peking talks and pressed Moscow's current polemical offensive. However, they

* A general discussion of the session appears in the TRENDS Supplement of 12 June 1970, "Hanoi Propaganda on Sixth Session of the DRV National Assembly."

** In the first anti-Soviet attack included in propaganda on Mao's 20 May statement, NCNA on 10 June quoted a member of the Congo-K "patriotic armed forces" as pledging struggle against not only the United States but also "the despicable and heinous Soviet revisionist social imperialism."

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did not accuse the Chinese of creating tension along the border or of conducting war preparations, a theme that was prominent in Soviet comment earlier this year and was voiced by Brezhnev and Kirilenko on 14 April.

There were varying emphases in the three leaders' remarks on the China question, perhaps reflecting their differing roles as spokesmen. Thus Kosygin, the head of government and the negotiator of the opening of talks, for the first time went on record with an attack on the Chinese for impeding the negotiations. He alone among the three stated explicitly that the Soviet Union intends to continue the talks, despite their "complexity" and the lack of progress "through the fault" of the Chinese side. In his 4 May press conference on Cambodia, Kosygin had also affirmed Moscow's intent to persist in the talks. An abridged version of his 10 June speech published in the press on the 11th did not include his statement that the Soviets would continue the talks.

In his speech, the only one to be carried in full in the central press, Brezhnev promised to hold the ideological line firmly against the Chinese while seeking the "earliest normalization" of state relations "on the broadest basis"--an allusion to a package of measures to improve relations in addition to the border question. Like Kosygin, he attributed the impasse at the talks to the Chinese. He remarked cryptically that the Soviets have "taken measures to do away with tension" on the border, but he mentioned only the initiation of negotiations.

Podgarnyy took the toughest stance toward the Chinese, attacking Mao by name and voicing Moscow's recent line on Peking's "pseudorevolutionary" behavior: "Foreign observers," he said, note "with some justification" that the Chinese "pseudorevolutionary vociferous clamor" sinks to an inaudible whisper when it comes to a question of "a practical rebuff" to aggressors. He seems to have expressed the views of the military establishment when, in a later passage, he described the armed forces as a reliable shield "and, if need be, a sword too, crushing all those who would encroach upon our socialist motherland." Aiming a warning at the Chinese, in the manner of Marshal Grechko's 8 May speech on V-E Day, he observed that both "West and East" had convincing proof of the effectiveness of that sword in World War II. In still another passage with military overtones, he explained that international tension requires the allocation of resources for defense needs.

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None of the other Politburo members' election speeches, as reported in Soviet media, referred to the Peking talks, though some commented on China. In speeches on 4 June Shelepin, as reported by the Leningrad radio, and Mazurov, as published on the 5th in SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, attacked the policies of the "Mao Tse-tung group" and called for joint struggle against imperialism as the basis for improving relations. Suslov, in a speech carried by T.A.S. on the 9th, stressed the role of last June's International party conference in striking a blow at "opportunistic and nationalist tendencies in some detachments of the communist movement," but he did not name the Chinese.

TAIWAN ISSUE In attempting to counter Peking's self-portrayal as a champion of revolutionary causes, Moscow has been calling attention to the PRC's failure to make good on irridentist claims on Hong Kong and Taiwan--an issue made the more sensitive by Moscow's linkage of it with the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Thus, two recent Soviet commentaries in Mandarin, charging Mao with abandoning the cause of recovering Taiwan and implying Sino-U.S. collusion in downplaying the Taiwan issue, claimed that PLA units "trained to deal with the elements of the Chiang gang" have gradually been transferrrd from the Fukien front to the Sino-Soviet border area. A Radio Moscow commentary on 10 June twitted the Chinese by observing that since U.S. warships are free to enter Taiwan ports "this means they are permitted to enter PRC territorial waters" and by noting that Taiwan serves as a logistic base for U.S. operations in Indochina. Asserting that this activity has evoked only "a paper warning," the commentary said the Taiwan question has been lost amid "the fanatic anti-Soviet clamor and war hysteria" and suggested that Mao "intends to sacrifice a pawn for the sake of another, more important chess move."

A commentary in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress on the 11th, noting the continued occupation of Quemoy and Matsu by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, explained that the Chiang regime need not worry about expanding PRC-U.S. contacts in the light of Peking's growing hostility toward the Soviet Union and the fact that PLA units have been transferred from the Taiwan Strait area to the Sino-Soviet border.

PEKING SHOWS FLEXIBLE APPROACH, GIVES SUPPORT TO ROMANIA

Peking's flexible approach, evidently calculated to give the lie to persisting Soviet claims that the Chinese are isolated and intransigent, has been shown in messages of sympathy and donations from the PRC Red Cross to Peru and Hungary regarding recent natural disasters in those

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countries and, most notably, in a message on 13 June from Chou En-lai to Premier Kosygin offering condolences for recent floods and earthquakes in the Soviet Union. Chou's gesture was made against the background of Kang Sheng's thinly veiled attack, in a speech welcoming the Romanian delegation on the 9th, in effect accusing the Soviets of seeking to exploit the disastrous Romanian floods to impose their will on Bucharest.

The Romanian delegation headed by Emil Bodnarus was given a conspicuously warm welcome in Peking, including meeting with Mao and Lin for "a long, cordial, and friendly conversation." Bodnarus reciprocated with what amounted to a defense brief against the Soviet indictment of the Chinese as heretics and subversives. Peking media's treatment of the visit suggests that the Chinese decided to upgrade the level of their invitation. The original announcement on the delegation's arrival on the 9th--carried by the Peking domestic service at 1200 GMT and shortly thereafter by NCNA--said the visit was at the invitation of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. The Peking radio repeated this announcement several times in subsequent broadcasts, but at 2100 GMT it inserted a phrase attributing the invitation to the CCP Central Committee as well as the NPC Standing Committee. NCNA made the same change in transmissions in English at 2007 GMT and in Chinese at 2122 GMT.

Chou En-lai on the 11th followed up Kang Sheng's attack on the limited sovereignty doctrine on the first day of the visit by expressing a community of interests between the Chinese and Romanians vis-a-vis Soviet charges of nationalism. While not naming the Soviets, Chou accused them of interfering in other countries' internal affairs and alluded to their invasion of Czechoslovakia as demonstrating their "out-and-out big-power chauvinism and hegemonism." In a pitch directed at Bucharest's concern over the rigidity caused by the division of Europe into opposing military blocs, Chou referred to large numbers of foreign troops stationed in European countries dominated by "this or that military bloc" and called for opposition to efforts of the United States "and its accomplice" to use their military blocs to maintain spheres of influence.

Among the Chinese officials present at various ceremonies attending the visit was Chiao Kuan-hua, the PRC's chief negotiator at the border talks. As a vice foreign minister, Chiao deals with Soviet and East European affairs and hence is often present at functions involving countries of this area.

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ROMANIA

LEADER VISITS TO PEKING, PARIS UNDERScore INDEPENDENCE

Romania continues to provide indications of resolve to pursue its balancing act between Peking and Moscow while at the same time improving its ties with the West. Bucharest media devoted considerable attention to the Bodnarus visit to the PRC (the delegation returned to Bucharest on 12 June) and are presently playing up Ceausescu's friendship visit to Paris, which began on 15 June, as a model of coexistence in action. Prior to his departure for Paris, Ceausescu took the occasion of a LE MONDE interview, published in the French paper on 16 June, to again reassure Moscow that Romania is ready to live up to its Warsaw Pact and CEMA obligations and to pursue further "cooperation" with the Soviets. Bucharest's SCINTEIA on 13 June, in another apparent gesture toward Moscow, devoted a full page to a report on Brezhnev's 12 June election speech--apparently the first instance in recent years of such extensive coverage of a Soviet leader's address in the Romanian press.

Moscow's reaction to the Romanian displays of independence have been restrained. The only monitored Soviet reference to the Bodnarus visit was a brief TASS report in PRAVDA on 13 June that the delegation stopped off in Moscow en route to Bucharest after "an official friendship visit to North Korea and China." Brezhnev, mentioning the Romanian-Soviet treaty briefly in his 12 June Supreme Soviet speech, made no attempt to lecture Moscow's maverick ally on its socialist obligations and appeared in general to play down problems in international party relations. On 13 June TASS announced that Brezhnev would go to Bucharest in early July for the long delayed signing of the new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty, and a Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on the 16th hailed the new treaty as a contribution to "strengthening friendship and unity."

CEAUSESCU in his first public statement on the new Soviet-
INTERVIEW Romanian treaty, according to a 16 June Radio
 Bucharest account of the LE MONDE interview,
Ceausescu noted that the treaty to be signed during Brezhnev's
visit is one "that was worked out and initialled some time ago."
The implication appears to be that it is not a newly revised version
on the model of the recently signed Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia,
which encompasses the limited sovereignty doctrine and calls for
a broadened commitment for mutual defense against attack by "any

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country." According to Radio Bucharest, Ceausescu also reasserted Romania's willingness to cooperate further in CEMA and to meet its obligations in the Warsaw Pact, but made no mention of the sensitive issues of bloc integration and the holding of Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil. In response to a question on Romania's relations with the PRC, he described them as "good," adding that they "demonstrate once again the correctness of Romania's consistent policy of developing multilateral cooperation with all socialist countries." This has been a theme of Romanian press comment on the Bodnarus visit to Peking.

On the 16th, a Radio Moscow report on the interview picked up Ceausescu's reassurances on CEMA and the Warsaw Pact and reported his comment that the new treaty would be an important contribution to strengthening Soviet-Romanian friendship, but omitted his remark that the treaty was worked out some time ago.

CEAUSESCU VISIT TO PARIS Romanian media have been using the Ceausescu visit to Paris to reaffirm Romanian foreign policy principles and have depicted it as an example of proper relations between communist and noncommunist states. Thus AGERPRES commented on the 13th that both Romania and France--"independent countries which are masters of their own fate"--are developing relations "firmly based on the principles of sovereignty, equal rights, and noninterference." Ceausescu's visit, it added, will be a valuable contribution "to peaceful coexistence" and to raising friendly Romanian-French relations "to a higher level."

Similarly, in a toast at a luncheon in his honor on the 16th reported by AGERPRES, Ceausescu said French-Romanian cooperation demonstrates that "two peoples with different social systems, wishing to live in peace and understanding, not admitting to a policy of domination and force, can coexist" He went on to lament that there "are still some states that did not understand and do not want to understand that the policy of domination of other peoples is a matter of the past, that no kind of attempt to impose domination on other peoples, of subjecting a people, has any future." Although he went on to criticize the United States' Cambodian policy in this context, Ceausescu's remarks also have obvious implications for the Soviet Union.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SEES IMPERIALISM BEHIND JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN CLASHES

Through 11 June Moscow gave minimal attention to the clashes between the Jordanian army and Palestinian fedayeen which erupted in Jordan on the 7th. Short TASS reports from Cairo cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) for factual reports on the situation. On the 9th TASS attributed to MENA a report of an attempt on the life of King Husayn, but did not indicate the perpetrators of the attack. Nor have Moscow media been heard to report Husayn's removal of the armed forces commander in chief and the armored corps commander on 11 June at fedayeen insistence. PRAVDA merely noted on the 14th that consultations were continuing between the Jordanian authorities and representatives of the resistance movement, which "is demanding radical improvements in the situation after the elimination of the elements which caused the crisis." And on the 15th PRAVDA reported that a "rebellious armored battalion" had attempted to move into Amman in an effort to restore to their posts "persons whom Husayn had removed in accordance with the Palestinians' demands."

A Primakov commentary in the 12 June PRAVDA, reported by TASS, set the stage for subsequent comment in blaming the clashes on "American agents operating in Jordan" with the aim of increasing tension and ultimately making the Arabs agree to a surrender dictated by Israel. At the same time, Primakov leveled criticism--not repeated in later propaganda--against "some elements" in the Palestinian movement who are "objectively assisting" the Americans, "advocating the principle 'the worse, the better.'" Through their "irresponsible adventurist actions," Primakov said, these elements harm the Arab peoples' "difficult and complex struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression." He went on to mention approvingly the "calm and weighted approach" of Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and "some other Arab capitals" and remarked that the urgent arrival of Fatah leader Yasir Arafat in Jordan "likewise helped much" in relaxing the situation.

Criticism of "irresponsible elements" among the fedayeen has been infrequent in the past several months: In the most recent previous instance, a NEW TIMES article on 21 April observed only that there was not complete unity among the Palestinian organizations and that they "often differ as regards the tactics, methods, and even the aims of their struggle." In a PRAVDA article on 19 November last year on a fedayeen-army confrontation in Lebanon, Primakov had set

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forth the same criticism that "certain elements" in the Palestinian movement, preaching the slogan "the worse, the better," could hinder the Arab struggle "by their extremism." NEW TIMES articles on 24 September and 2 November referred to "extremist" groups pursuing terror tactics and noted that most of the other fedayeen organizations condemned such methods.

Since the publication of the 12 June Primakov article Moscow propaganda has cited Arab sources to enlarge on the theme that the confrontation in Jordan was an imperialist intrigue engineered by "U.S. agents." A commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 13th, citing a Fatah spokesman's statement to that effect, says that even if one "leaves aside the information on which Fatah based that statement," the United States is undoubtedly displaying a "tendentious interest" in the crisis.

Cairo dispatches by Glukhov in PRAVDA on 14 and 15 June say the UAR is giving special attention to "Washington's attempted military blackmail," in particular the combat readiness of the 82d Airborne Division. And a domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on the 14th, observing that this would not be the first time Washington prepared to send troops to intervene "on the pretext of protecting American citizens," charges that the Israeli army also "was preparing for an incursion into Jordan to protect foreigners." A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 16th also claims that during the events in Jordan Washington was preparing for possible intervention, "including the landing of U.S. forces," while Israeli papers were reporting that Tel Aviv wanted to carry out a "great action against Jordan in the immediate future" to occupy another part of its territory.

USSR ANTICIPATES U.S. DECISION ON PLANE DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL

Moscow continues to underline Congressional and "U.S. Zionist" pressure for the earliest delivery of new consignments of planes to Israel, suggesting that such a decision is virtually assured. At the same time, comment stresses the "change in the balance of forces" in the region, increased Israeli losses, and improved Arab combat capability, maintaining that time is working against "imperialism and its Israeli allies." Vishnevskiy says in the 14 June PRAVDA that Israel's "course toward 'eternal' confrontation is hopeless," and that Washington, with its assurances about moral support and military supplies for Israel, is "sinking into the mire of military adventurism in the Middle East."

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TASS on the 11th had pointed out that Secretary of State Rogers twice recently "reaffirmed U.S. intention to deliver a new consignment of war planes to Israel shortly." A Tyssovskiy commentary broadcast in the domestic service on the 13th said Washington is increasingly closer to a solution of this question in favor of Tel Aviv. TASS on the same day saw the Senate rejection of the Williams amendment to the law on arms sales abroad as clearing the way for the government to announce deliveries of war planes.

A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 15th, noting the rejection of this "attempt by a group of sober-minded Senators to put U.S. arms deliveries to foreign states under Senate control," charges that the arms delivery question is being used by Washington as a means of open pressure on the Arab countries. The commentary cites UPI to the effect that the Administration "makes the size of the new consignment of offensive arms for Israel directly dependent on President Nasir's agreement to conduct talks with Tel Aviv" without the evacuation of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

Propagandists say the U.S. press is trying to justify the anticipated decision by explaining that Israel will get the planes gradually, and they will merely be replacements for aircraft lost in combat. A panelist on the 14 June domestic service commentators' roundtable expressed the opinion that the question of additional aircraft deliveries had been settled and it only remained to be determined whether to satisfy Israel's demands fully or "for the time being" to send perhaps only half the planes. The panelists questioned why "rehabilitation of the defense capability" of the Arab countries should disturb the balance of power in the Middle East, Shishkin asking why the equilibrium of forces must be such that Israel has to be stronger than the Arab countries. Commentator Kolesnichenko observed that the USSR and the other socialist states were playing a "decisive role" in "doing a little to prevent the aggressor from enjoying the fruits of its attack and bringing about a change in the alinement of strength in its favor." Shishkin interjected--without further comment--the remark that the "Tel Aviv hawks" say they are not fighting against the Arab peoples but are "resisting the military penetration of the Soviet Union in the Middle East."

SOVIET LEADERS' ELECTION SPEECHES REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR ARABS

Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Brezhnev, in their Supreme Soviet election speeches on 10, 11, and 12 June, did not depart from established propaganda lines in their remarks on the Middle East. Kosygin was

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the only one of the three to name the United States in asserting that Israeli ruling circles and "their imperialist patrons, primarily the United States," have not achieved their aim of removing the "progressive" Arab regimes. On the contrary, he said, these regimes have been reinforced, and friendship and close cooperation between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union have been strengthened despite attempts by the "Arabs' enemies" to sow distrust between the Arabs and the USSR. Kosygin did not repeat the statement in his 20 May message to the heads of state of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan that the USSR is rendering "extensive assistance" to the Arab states, but merely pledged "all-round support" for the UAR, Syria, and other Arab states."

Kosygin remarked that the Israeli Government's failure up to now to strive for a just and peaceful settlement is explained by its confidence in U.S. support. He made no further mention of the need for a peaceful political settlement, nor was this standard Soviet call repeated by Brezhnev or Podgorny. Such a solution continues to be urged in routine propaganda, however, and Kosygin said in his 20 May message that the Soviet Union was working for the earliest political settlement.

Podgorny in his speech reiterated past Soviet assertions that the prolongation of the Middle East conflict does not benefit Israel itself, and he promised to continue "the necessary assistance" to the Arab countries and people. Declaring that the "Israeli extremists" are attempting by force of arms to impose on the Arabs their own conditions for interstate relations, Podgorny said Israel must understand that it will never succeed in safeguarding its security by means of war.

Brezhnev similarly asserted that it is high time for the "Tel Aviv rulers and all those who encourage them" to understand that nothing can be achieved by stepping up hostilities. Like Kosygin, he pointed to expanded and stronger contacts between the Soviet Union and the Arab world, and he pledged the Soviet Union "to go on supporting the just cause of the Arab peoples." He was the only one of the three to mention the Arab "defense capacity," remarking that it "has been restored." And he was the only one to refer to the November 1967 Security Council resolution, saying it provides the road to a Middle East settlement and adding that "liberation of the captured Arab territories" is the "key prerequisite" for this settlement.

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While Moscow propaganda most commonly urges Israeli withdrawal, the term "liberation of the territories" has appeared from time to time in elite statements and routine propaganda since at least September 1967. Kosygin in a speech in Kishinev that month employed both expressions, declaring that a solution of the problem consists primarily of "withdrawing the troops of the aggressors, liberating territory occupied by Israel, and reestablishing the Arab people's legal rights." That use of the word "liberation" does not imply Soviet approval of Arab military action to regain the occupied territories seemed evident from Kosygin's statement in July 1968: At a press conference in Sweden, he said that "while the aggressor Israel holds on to the territory of others and shows no desire to liberate it, one can scarcely expect success in negotiations about settling the conflict." Currently, Zykov says in the 9 June IZVESTIYA that peace must be based on "Israel's liberation of the seized lands" and mutual recognition of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all interested countries.

MOSCOW REITERATES POSITION ON ISRAEL'S "RIGHT TO EXIST"

Moscow recently has seemed at pains to rebut any notion that the USSR favors the elimination of the state of Israel. In the 5 June communique on Gromyko's visit to France, both sides express the opinion that a just peace must be based on Israeli withdrawal and "acceptance by all interested countries of the obligation to recognize the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each of them." And in remarks in Paris on the 3d, reported by AFP, Gromyko stated that Israel, like all other countries, has the right to exist as a sovereign nation. Subsequently, panelist Primakov, in the domestic service roundtable on 7 June, complained that Israeli Prime Minister Meir "lied openly" about the position of the Soviet Union, "which she says allegedly wants to liquidate the state of Israel." A Kozyakov commentary broadcast to North America on the 10th again pointed out that the November 1967 Security Council resolution guarantees the sovereign rights of every Middle East country, "including Israel." Kozyakov added that "if the resolution is acted upon, there will clearly be no need for the military aid the Soviet Union is presently giving the UAR to repulse Israeli aggression."

A broadcast in Yiddish over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 11th, responding to Israeli Prime Minister Meir's remarks on Soviet interests in the Middle East, maintained that the USSR has no selfish interests in the region and no reason

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to increase tension in the area, but only wants a just and permanent settlement. The commentary insisted that the Soviet Union "has never suggested and does not now suggest the liquidation of the state of Israel." Recalling the Soviet vote in the United Nations in favor of the creation of a Jewish state, the broadcast said that this view has never changed: The Soviet Union "only opposes aggression and the adventurist policy of the rulers of today's Israel." If Israel were to accept withdrawal from the occupied territories and if political problems were resolved, "there would be not the slightest obstacle" to a Middle East settlement.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

USSR LEADERS RESTATE STOCK FOREIGN POLICY THEMES IN SPEECHES

Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy, in speeches to their constituents on the eve of the 14 June Supreme Soviet elections, treated a wide range of foreign policy issues in largely pro forma fashion.* All three leaders repledged Moscow to pursuit of a peace policy, and Brezhnev added somewhat defensively in his address on the 12th that the USSR's adherence to a policy of peaceful coexistence should not be confused with "pacifism, with 'nonresistance to evil,' to the evil that is brought to the peoples by the imperialist aggressors."

Brezhnev and Podgornyy reaffirmed a continuing Soviet interest in halting the arms race, while Kosygin confined his remarks on disarmament to a reference to the efforts of the Warsaw Pact states to achieve a nonproliferation agreement. None of the three mentioned the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) now underway in Vienna. Of Soviet leaders' election speeches available at this writing, only that of Mazurov, in Minsk on 4 June, referred to SALT. As reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on the 5th, Mazurov said that the USSR hopes for the successful outcome of the negotiations, but concluded that success can be realized "only if the other side shows realism, good will, a constructive approach." Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy stressed the adequacy of Soviet defense capabilities, viewing these capabilities as an essential counter to the "imperialist" threat and a vital factor in the strengthening of world peace.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS All three leaders expressed concern over the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Podgornyy's 11 June speech contained the most negative assessment, stating that relations are "not developing" and "are practically in a kind of frozen state" because of "the aggressive course of the United States, its endeavors to interfere in the affairs of other peoples and to become their masters." Unlike Brezhnev and Kosygin, Podgornyy did not call for an improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington.

* Their remarks on Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and China are discussed, respectively, in the Indochina, Middle East, and Sino-Soviet Relations sections of this TRENDS. The USSR Internal Affairs section reviews their comments on domestic issues and examines the amount and nature of publicity for the three speeches in Soviet media.

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Kosygin said in his speech on the 10th that the "aggressive forces of American imperialism" are the "main source" of international tension, that these actions "can only put us on our guard," and that they are the main reason why relations between the two countries have not developed further. For its part, Kosygin added, the USSR considers that the establishment of good relations would correspond not only with the interests of the Soviet people but also with the interests of peace, particularly in view of "the real position in the world of the Soviet Union and the United States." He concluded that those in the United States who think that only the Soviet side has an interest in improving political and economic relations "are deeply mistaken."

Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union's peace policy and its readiness to administer a "worthy rebuff to aggression" merge together, and that "this is the angle from which one should view our foreign policy efforts, including our relations with the United States." Noting the "deep contradictions" between the United States and the USSR stemming from their disparate class systems, Brezhnev observed that this does not rule out the possibility of resolving international problems by peaceful means and in fact makes it necessary to develop better bilateral relations, "the more so since there are forces in the United States which adhere to this position and advocate a realistic approach to international affairs."

Brezhnev said the USSR has "positively received" President Nixon's statement on moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, but expressed concern that the "peace-loving statements" of the Administration "run counter to its aggressive actions, aggravating the international situation." Gromyko, in speeches before the Supreme Soviet last July and the UN General Assembly in September, had been the first regime spokesman to take note of the President's remarks on the era of confrontation becoming one of negotiation. The 4 May Soviet Government statement on Cambodia--read by Kosygin at a Kremlin press conference--also referred to this statement, asking how the President's words could be squared with the intrusion of U.S. troops into Cambodia.

In response to his rhetorical question about the possibility of improving relations with the United States, Brezhnev said this requires that U.S. policy should be based on a sober assessment of the actual state of affairs in the world and that Washington should reckon with the lawful interests of the USSR and its allies as well as with the sovereignty and independence of all countries. In sum, he concluded, the United States "should embark upon the road of relaxing international tension, leading to the strengthening of international peace."

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RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY Pledging the USSR to a quest for good relations with all the countries of the world, Brezhnev took note of the fact that "certain reassuring prospects" had opened up recently with regard to relations with the FRG. He observed that if "the positive elements" in FRG policy were developed and if the "revenge-seeking forces are bridled," the situation in Europe will be influenced in a positive way. The USSR, he said, views the recent exchange of views with Bonn "on reaching agreement on a line of important questions of their relations" as "useful" and is ready to continue the negotiations and to bring them to a positive conclusion. (Minimal Moscow comment available at this writing on the 14 June West German laender elections has leveled a predictable attack on alleged CDU/CSU efforts to "torpedo" the Brandt government's attempt to conclude a treaty with the USSR on renunciation of force.)

Kosygin and Podgornyy warned routinely in their speeches of the existence of "revanchist forces" in the FRG. Like Brezhnev, however, both saw some hope in the influence of "sober" circles who understand the reality of today's world. Both mentioned that there will be further negotiations with Bonn, Kosygin observing that "time will show their final results."

EUROPEAN SECURITY Brezhnev is the only one of the three leaders to break new ground in connection with the problem of European security. Noting the "broad support" for the Warsaw Pact proposal for a pan-European conference with a two-point agenda (renunciation of the use of force and the broadening of economic and other ties), he went on to state that "the nations concerned could set up also some sort of a permanently functioning mechanism for the practical elaboration and implementation of concerted measures." The reference to such a permanent "mechanism" may have been responsive to a proposal advanced at the 26-27 May NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Rome for the creation of a permanent commission at the ambassadorial level for talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The proposal had been briefly acknowledged and dismissed in Moscow's propaganda at the time as a poor substitute for a European security conference.

Podgornyy and Kosygin joined Brezhnev in endorsing the proposal for a European security conference. None of the three broached the matter of U.S. participation, although Kosygin asserted that the United States "continues to promote resistance" to such a gathering, apparently fearing that its convening "would run counter to the increase in military preparations by the aggressive NATO bloc."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

TOP LEADERS DISCUSS ECONOMIC REFORM, RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

Indicators to the positions of the top Soviet leaders on the economic reform and resource allocations for the projected new five-year plan are seen in their campaign speeches just prior to the Supreme Soviet elections.

Kosygin and Mazurov strongly defended the economic reform and said it would be extended. They were backed up by approving statements on the reform by Podgornyy, Pelshe, Voronov, Polyanskiy, and Shelepin. Mazurov and Shelepin endorsed the production associations promoted by the Leningraders and many reform advocates as a means to advance the cause of economic reform and improve management. Brezhnev, however, merely commented that "we have learned much" from the reform, and others ignored the subject. Shelest, Kirilenko, and Masherov, although they discussed related economic problems in detail, concentrated on scientific-technical progress, the use of computers, and improved discipline as an aid to better economic performance.

A difference in emphasis was evident in discussions of the new five-year plan. Polyanskiy, Kulakov, and Brezhnev asserted that the new plan would greatly increase investments in agriculture. They received support from most Politburo members, including Kirilenko and Podgornyy. Voronov as usual conspicuously ignored the issue of increased investments in agriculture and advocated other means for boosting agricultural production. In general, pledges of more aid for agriculture were far stronger than for consumer goods. Increased consumer goods production was promised only by Shelepin and Voronov. Suslov and Shelest were firmest in urging a strengthening of defense, and Masherov and Shelest stressed the development of science and technology.

PUBLICITY FOR SPEECHES The speeches of Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Brezhnev were broadcast live and in full by Radio Moscow on 10, 11, and 12 June, respectively. The central press published the full text of Brezhnev's speech only, thereby giving it almost twice as much space as Kosygin's or Podgornyy's. The local MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 12 June carried full text of the speeches by Kosygin and Podgornyy (although the previous day the paper had carried the same lengthy account of Kosygin's speech that was published in the central papers).

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The central press and Radio Moscow carried lengthy accounts of the speeches by other Politburo members, but they were clearly excerpted versions and, in part, summations. What appear to be full or nearly full texts are available from local papers, however, for the speeches of Pelshe, Sholest, Mazurov, Mzhavanadze, Rashidov, Shcherbitskiy, Kunayev, and Masherov, and the text of Shelepin's speech was broadcast by the Leningrad radio.

KOSYGIN AND MAZUROV DEFEND VIABILITY OF REFORM PROGRAM

Kosygin and First Deputy Premier Mazurov, who have been the most directly involved in the economic reform, defended it vigorously in their speeches. Kosygin declared that "the reform has proved its viability; already we can point out its positive results." He attributed the rise in labor productivity to the introduction of scientific and technical achievements and to "transferring enterprises to the new conditions of management." He reported that "measures are being worked out to extend economic reform to the system of material-technical supply." Mazurov declared that "we are on the right track" regarding economic reform, and "one cannot help associating with the skillful use of the principles of economic reform the happy fact that during the past four years productivity of labor in Belorussia's industry grew faster than provided for in the five-year plan" (PRAVDA, 5 June). "The reform thus far has been introduced mainly on the lower level--on the enterprise level," he explained, but "now the time has come to think of extending its principles vertically--both upward, rearranging the work of management organs, and downward, carrying it to every working position."

Implicitly replying to recent criticisms of the reform, Kosygin and Mazurov pointed out that difficulties in applying such a complicated and large-scale system are to be expected. In connection with the December plenum, Kosygin noted that some elements of the reform must be improved, but insisted that such improvement will only strengthen the new system. Mazurov said the economic transformations cannot be achieved by "waving a magic wand."

Kosygin and Mazurov appeared to receive support from Podgornyy, Pelshe, Voronov, Polyanskiy and Shelepin. Podgornyy stated that "the economic reform has shown its effectiveness" (live broadcast on 11 June--not in PRAVDA's 12 June account). Pelshe declared that the economic reform opens "to every member of a working collective wide opportunities for showing his creative forces

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and abilities in the interests of accelerating technological progress, improving the administration of production, improving organization of labor, and efficiently eliminating shortcomings." He also noted the "very important" growth in labor productivity as a result of the new system (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 4 June--not in the 4 June PRAVDA account).

Vorobey stated that "the new economic reform is producing positive results," but he warned that it is a "complicated and painstaking matter" requiring "constant attention from all of us" (PRAVDA, 9 June). Polyanskiy and Shelepin praised the operation of the reform during the past four years. Polyanskiy declared that the greatest output "has been from enterprises that have switched over to the new system of planning and economic stimulation" (Radio Moscow, 3 June--not in the 4 June PRAVDA account). Shelepin noted that during the past four years the economy has been developed and improved "under conditions of implementation of the new economic reform and the scientific-technological revolution" (PRAVDA, 5 June).

PRODUCTION ASSOCIATIONS

Mazurov and Shelepin went firmly on record as endorsing the new production associations.

Endorsement of the associations presumably is also a sign of support for the economic reform, because the spread of associations would extend the reform upward and because the leading advocates of the associations--the Leningraders--appear to back the reform and to have the sympathy of liberal supporters of the economic reform.

Mazurov stated that "we are entering a new stage of the economic reform which is characterized on the one hand by seeking the most efficient pattern of administration--for example, creation of cost accounting associations with management functions and liquidation of excess administrative echelons--and on the other hand, by a systematic approach embracing all main aspects of the entire economy" (PRAVDA, 5 June).

Shelepin, speaking in Leningrad, congratulated the Leningraders for being "the first in the country to set up a number of production and scientific production associations, on the basis of cost accounting," and declared that "the Leningraders' experience has been approved by the Central Committee" (Radio Moscow on 4 June--not in the 5 June PRAVDA account). Kosygin did not directly mention the production associations, but he spoke of intensifying "the concentration and specialization of production"--a term Leningraders often use for their system.

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In contrast to Kosygin and Mazurov, Brezhnev only mentioned the economic reform once and without elaboration. Declaring that "we have learned much" in the past four years, he explained that "I have in mind the work done by the party in the field of economic reform and, if we look more broadly, also in improving our whole economic policy, bringing it into conformity with the present stage of development of the Soviet economy."

All other speakers ignored the production associations and the economic reform as well. The omission of such references from the speeches of Shelest, Kirilenko, and Masherov, who discussed industrial problems at length without ever mentioning the reform, were notable. They concentrated instead on introduction of computers and other scientific-technical advances and enforcement of discipline. Although Masherov rose under Mazurov's tutelage, he voiced no support of the reform and viewed the wide introduction of computers and automation as the road to improved economic administration (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 29 May). Nearly complete versions of Masherov's and Shelest's speeches are available in the republican papers, so their omissions can be reliably determined. Only brief accounts of Kirilenko's Sverdlovsk speech are available, so it is not certain that he failed to mention the reform or the production associations. Until now, Kirilenko had apparently been the only leader to offer specific praise for the Leningraders' associations--eight years ago, when they were first introduced.

FURTHER AID TO AGRICULTURE URGED BY MOST SPEAKERS

In looking to the future, most leaders urged more aid to agriculture; but their statements were vague, and no figures were cited. The two leaders with direct responsibility for agriculture, Polyanskiy and Kulakov, made strong pleas for their sector.

Polyanskiy declared that the "tasks of creating an abundance of agricultural products" and bringing rural living standards up to urban standards requires "improving the proportions in the development of the two leading branches of public production--industry and agriculture--and overcoming the lagging of the light, food, and meat-dairy industries behind the growing needs of the country." He asserted that the new five-year plan provides for an unprecedented increase in investments in agriculture (PRAVDA, 4 June).

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Kulakov said that the Central Committee attributes the "unsatisfactory level" of agricultural production to the failure to provide a more powerful material-technical base; "the creation of such a base will be one of the central tasks of the new five-year plan" (PRAVDA, 5 June).

Brezhnev, apparently agreeing with Polyanskiy and Kulakov, based the possibility of increasing agricultural production entirely on sharply increasing allocation of resources for agriculture. He argued that a "further sharp increase" of agricultural production depends on creation of the necessary material-technical base and that this is the "essence of the matter." He stated that this means a "sharp" increase in equipment and fertilizer deliveries and in rural construction. Implicitly rebutting opponents of increased investment in agriculture, Brezhnev said that these tasks will certainly be accomplished but it is "all a question of time periods." It can be dragged out for 25 years, or it can be "significantly accelerated." "We favor the second course," he declared, and added that in the new five-year plan "the volume of capital investments in agriculture will be increased still more." But Brezhnev admitted that the precise increase had not yet been agreed on: With work on the direction of the new plan still continuing "it would be premature to speak about concrete figures and assignments."

Other speakers sounded favorably inclined but less committed. Admitting the current meat shortages, Kosygin noted that in the new plan "measures will be taken to insure further growth of agricultural production." Podgornyy declared that "we intend to considerably increase capital investments in agriculture and strengthen even more its material-technical base." Suslov stated that "the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government are taking the necessary measures so that agriculture will develop at an even faster rate in the years to come" (PRAVDA, 10 June).

Kirilenko spoke about the "sharp strengthening" of agriculture's material-technical base and unprecedented deliveries of equipment and fertilizer (PRAVDA, 6 June). Pelshe said that in the plan "measures will be taken to significantly raise the level of agricultural production and seriously strengthen its material-technical base" (SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, 4 June). Mazurov said that "one must intensify the rates of agricultural development" and that the new plan will include "appropriate measures to raise agriculture." He added, however, that "the same approach is needed for resolving the tasks of supplying the population with enough consumer goods" (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 5 June).

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Shelepin spoke of narrowing the differences between rural and urban living standards, but he, like Mazurov, appeared to link agriculture and consumer goods: "In the coming five-year plan more energetic measures will be taken to significantly increase the production of agricultural products and consumer goods" (PRAVDA, 5 June).

Masherov noted the need to improve the technical equipping of agriculture (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 29 May), while Solomentsev said that the re-equipping of the village with modern machinery is "one of the main tasks" of "all communists and the whole people" (PRAVDA, 4 June). Shelest noted only that "raising agriculture is a matter for the whole party and all the Soviet people" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 2 June). Voronov completely ignored new inputs for agriculture, concentrating on the need to reduce costs in agriculture and to introduce unregulated links (PRAVDA, 9 June).

CONSUMER GOODS Few promises were made regarding more investment in consumer goods. Voronov stated that increasing the production of consumer goods "is one of the central tasks" in the new five-year plan (PRAVDA, 9 June), and Shelepin spoke of "more energetic measures" for both agriculture and consumer goods. Kosygin applauded the present "closing of the gap between the pace of producing means of production and that of consumer goods" but did not promise anything for the future. On the other hand, Brezhnev suggested continued priority for heavy industry: "I can assure the electors" that the new plan "provides for further significant growth of industry, primarily those branches which produce means of production, insure the power base of the economy, and determine scientific-technical progress."

DEFENSE The strongest statement on defense came from Suslov, who declared that because of US aggressiveness, "we must not weaken vigilance for a moment, we must constantly improve the country's defenses and arm the Soviet army and navy with the most up-to-date weapons" (TASS, 9 June). Shelest said that "fulfillment of the tasks of the new five-year plan will make it possible to further strengthen the economic and defensive might of our fatherland--the USSR" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 2 June).

Statements by Kirilenko, Brezhnev, and Kosygin were phrased in slightly less specific terms. Kirilenko said that "all present-day circumstances require us, while consistently struggling for peace, not to weaken our concern for further strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet Union" (PRAVDA, 6 June). Brezhnev

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stated that "we are determined not to relax our attention in the future to the armed forces of our country." Kosygin noted that "the defensive might of the Soviet state must be invincible in the full sense of the word" and that "the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state and the strengthening of its defensive might serve the attainment of the single aim of insuring a stable peace on earth."

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY In the strongest formulation on science and technology, Masharov stated that "the new five-year plan must be a five-year plan of national struggle to raise the effectiveness and further intensify the whole public production on the basis of wide introduction of the achievements of science and technology, deepening and developing scientific methods of planning and economic stimulation" (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 29 May). Shelest said that "the main economic task of the new five-year plan is to utilize comprehensively the achievements of science and technology, improve methods of administering the economy, raise efficiency, and intensify public production" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 2 June). Kirilenko also spoke of accelerating scientific-technological progress.

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